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THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE ELECTION OF
AMTRAK’S PRESIDENT
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INTRODUCTION
In 2015, the Supreme Court determined that Amtrak—the corporation
created by federal statute and authorized to preserve passenger rail service—
is a governmental entity for separation of powers purposes.1 In his
concurrence, Justice Alito wrote that while Amtrak should be considered a
governmental entity, it did not necessarily follow that Amtrak’s corporate
structure was constitutionally sufficient.2 He had a particular problem with
the President of Amtrak and the way he was elected.3
At the time the opinion was written, Amtrak’s board consisted of nine
members.4
Eight of these members, including the Secretary of
Transportation, were appointed by the President of the United States and
confirmed by the Senate.5 Those eight members, in turn, elected the
President of Amtrak as the ninth member of the board.6 The President of
Amtrak had voting power, just like the rest of the board, and was able to sway
decisions one way or another.7 Justice Alito took issue with this provision. If
Amtrak is a federal entity and the President of Amtrak has sway over the
board’s decisions, Justice Alito reasoned, he should be considered a principal
officer of the United States and should be appointed by the President of the
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Comments Editor, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 21. University of
Pennsylvania Law School, J.D., 2019; Tufts University, B.A., 2015. Thank you to Professor Ryan
Doerfler for spurring an interest in this area of law and guiding me through writing this Comment.
Thank you as well to everyone on the Volume 21 team at the Journal of Constitutional Law for their
help during the past year and especially the editing process. Most importantly, thank you to my
parents for supporting me throughout my academic career.
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1233 (2015).
Id. at 1240 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1239.
See 49 U.S.C. § 24302(a)(1) (2008) (amended 2012); Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1231.
See 49 U.S.C. § 24302(a)(1); Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1231.
See 49 U.S.C. § 24302(a)(1)(B); 49 U.S.C. § 24303(a); Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1231.
See Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1239 (Alito, J., concurring).
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United States and confirmed by the Senate.8
Since the Court’s decision, Congress passed the Fixing America’s Surface
Transportation (“FAST”) Act in December 2015.9 The FAST Act, inter alia,
slightly modified Amtrak’s board structure. Specifically, it made the
President of Amtrak a nonvoting board member, and added an another,
Amtrak-specific board member to be appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. This brought the total number of board members
to ten while retaining the same number of voting members.10 The FAST Act
was a massive piece of legislation that covered a wide range of issues, and
there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress changed the
board composition in response to Justice Alito’s concerns. However, by
taking the President’s voting power out of play, Congress had removed a
significant roadblock in determining whether the President of Amtrak is
constitutionally elected.
This does not mean, however, that Amtrak’s board structure is now
constitutional. To answer this question, this Comment proceeds in three
Parts. First, it confirms that Amtrak is in fact a regulatory body that is
subjected to the Appointments Clause. Second, it determines that while the
President of Amtrak wields enough authority to be considered an officer of
the United States, he is subordinate to the rest of the board and should be
considered an inferior officer of the United States. Third, this Comment
ascertains that Amtrak is a “Department” whose “Head” may appoint
inferior officers because it is independent from other government agencies.
Ultimately, I will make the argument that Congress’s actions in the FAST
Act fixed the constitutional problems with Amtrak’s board, rendering Justice
Alito’s concerns moot.
I. AMTRAK’S RELATIONSHIP TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Amtrak is a unique corporation that was conceived as a private service
with public support. The Supreme Court has twice heard cases relating to
Amtrak’s status as a governmental entity, holding that for both constitutional
rights and separation of powers purposes, Amtrak should be considered part
of the federal government. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has
further held that Amtrak possesses regulatory power. Thus, Amtrak is
required to follow the constraints of the Appointments Clause.
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Id.
Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 11205, 129 Stat. 1312, 1637
(2015).
Id.; 49 U.S.C. § 24302(a)(1)(C).
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A. Creation and Statutory Status of Amtrak
In 1970, President Richard Nixon signed into law the Rail Passenger
Service Act of 1970 (“RPSA”), which created the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation, popularly known as Amtrak.11 Amtrak was formed
in response to the decline in passenger ridership in order to preserve intercity
passenger train service.12 Although Amtrak was originally conceived as a forprofit corporation, Congress later amended the relevant statute to read that
Amtrak should be “managed as a for-profit corporation.”13 Importantly,
Congress explicitly states that Amtrak is not a “department, agency, or
instrumentality of the [United States] Government.”14
Congress’s disavowal of an agency relationship between the United
States Government and Amtrak has significant implications. For example,
Congress has the authority to remove regulatory agencies from the
constraints of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).15 Regardless of
Amtrak’s posture as a federal agency, there is no question that it would be
exempt from the APA and its requirements.16 Congress, through this
pronouncement, has also deprived Amtrak of sovereign immunity typically
afforded to the federal government17 and of the power to pledge the credit of
the United States on its debt obligations.18
However, Congress cannot override the Constitution. By simply labeling
Amtrak a corporation and by disclaiming any agency relationship, Congress
does not relieve Amtrak of its constitutional obligations if it is, in fact, an
agent of the government.19 In two cases, the Supreme Court held that
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Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, § 301, 84 Stat. 1327, 1330.
Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 383–84 (1995).
49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(2) (emphasis added); Lebron, 513 U.S. at 384–85 (emphasis added).
49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(3).
5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012); see, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 308–09 (1955) (holding that
because the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 included procedures distinct from those
required by the APA, Congress acted to exempt the deportation process from the APA’s
requirements).
See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 392.
Id.; see, e.g., Sentner v. Amtrak, 540 F. Supp. 557, 557–58 (D.N.J. 1982) (demonstrating that Amtrak
can be sued for damages).
Lebron, 513 U.S. at 392.
See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1231 (2015) (“Congressional
pronouncements, though instructive as to matters within Congress’s authority to address are not
dispositive of Amtrak’s status as a governmental entity for purposes of separation of powers analysis
under the Constitution.” (internal citation omitted) (citing United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier
Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.)); Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397 (“On that thesis,
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) can be resurrected by the simple device of having the State
of Louisiana operate segregated trains through a state-owned Amtrak.”).

900

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:3

Amtrak was a government actor based on this principle.20
B. Amtrak’s Status as a Governmental Entity
In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., the Court determined that
Amtrak is an “agency or instrumentality of the United States for the purpose
of individual rights guaranteed against the Government by the
Constitution.”21 In that case, the petitioner wanted to display a political
advertisement on the billboard leading into the entrance of Amtrak’s
Pennsylvania Station in New York City.22 Amtrak disapproved of the
advertisement based on its political nature and refused to display it.23 The
petitioner proceeded to file suit, alleging that Amtrak, acting as a government
actor, violated his First Amendment rights.24
The Court viewed two factors as pertinent when designating Amtrak as
a government actor. First, Amtrak was created “explicitly for the furtherance
of federal governmental goals.”25 Second, the government controls the
board of Amtrak through appointment by the President.26 Amtrak was thus
essentially the same as “so called independent regulatory agencies” because
the government could control Amtrak to do its specific federal governmental
goals.27 The Court had spoken: Amtrak was the federal government for
purposes of individual constitutional rights.
Twenty years later, the Court took a step further in deciding that Amtrak
is a governmental entity for separation of powers purposes in Department of
Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads.28 The issue in that case concerned
the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (“PRIIA”), which
directed the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) and Amtrak to jointly
create “metrics and standards” of measuring “performance and service
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See Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1232–33; Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397.
Lebron, 513 U.S. at 394.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 377.
Id.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 397–98. At the time the case was written, Congress had imposed more restrictions over whom
the President could appoint than exist currently. However, the Court found these to be
“restriction[s] imposed by one of the political branches upon the other” rather than “an absence of
control by the Government.” Id.
See id. at 398 (referring. to the Federal Communications Commission and the Securities Exchange
Commission as agencies which are “so-called independent” but under the “direction and control”
of the federal government).
135 S. Ct. 1225, 1232–33 (2015).
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quality of intercity passenger train operations.”29 The metrics and standards
were used, among other things, to determine whether delays to Amtrak’s
scheduled ridership were caused in part by host railroads’ freight
transportation.30 If the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) determined
this to be the case, it could award Amtrak damages from those host rail
carriers.31 The Association of American Railroads (“AAR”), the freight
railroad industry group, sued the Department of Transportation and
Amtrak, alleging that PRIIA was unconstitutional based on the violations of
the nondelegation doctrine and on Fifth Amendment due process grounds.32
Specifically, AAR alleged that the separation of powers doctrine was violated
“by placing legislative and rulemaking authority in the hands of a private
entity . . . that participates in the very industry it is supposed to regulate.”33
More still, AAR insisted it had not received due process because “the
coercive power of the government” had been placed in the hands of an
interested private party.34 Like Amtrak itself had done in Lebron, AAR
contended that Amtrak could not have been a government actor because of
Congress’s specificity that it “is not a department, agency, or instrumentality
of the United States Government.”35
The district court granted summary judgment to Amtrak, holding that
the political branches “exercise[ ] sufficient control over promulgation and
enforcement of the metrics and standards,” so the relevant part of PRIIA was
constitutional.36 AAR appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the district court, holding that Amtrak is a
“private corporation with respect to Congress’s power to
delegate . . . authority,” so Amtrak cannot be constitutionally granted “the
regulatory power prescribed in [PRIIA].”37
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit, holding that for
separation of powers purposes, Amtrak was a governmental entity.38 The
Court used similar factors when designating Amtrak a governmental entity
as it did in Lebron. It noted that the government created and controlled

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id. at 1229.
Id. at 1230.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id. at 1233 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id. at 1230; see also Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 865 F. Supp. 2d 22, 29 (D.D.C. 2012).
Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1233.
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Amtrak and “specif[ied] many of its day-to-day operations.”39 Further, the
government subsidizes Amtrak, sets its policy goals, and demands
accountability and transparency.40 Justice Alito’s concurrence suggested that
Amtrak held regulatory power, a point confirmed by Judge Brown on
remand.41 Judge Brown continued that since the metrics and standards that
Amtrak helped create needed to be incorporated into the operating
agreements of freight rail carriers “to the extent practicable,” Amtrak was
exerting regulatory power over private actors.42 Noncompliance may put
the carriers at “heightened risk of disadvantageous terms or rates,” which
encourage railroads to obey, signifying regulatory power.43
As far as the courts have spoken, Amtrak has regulatory power, should
be treated as a regulatory body, and is a governmental entity for separation
of powers purposes.44 As a part of the federal government, Congress did not
err in delegating regulatory authority to Amtrak. Amtrak is thus subject to
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution because of its ability to perform
executive functions.45
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Id. at 1234 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1236 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Because obedience to the metrics and standards materially
reduces the risk of liability, railroads face powerful incentives to obey. That is regulatory power.”);
Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 33–34 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 821 F.3d at 33 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id.
On remand, the D.C. Circuit determined that Congress had violated the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause by allowing “an entity to make law when, economically speaking, it has skin in the
game.” Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 821 F.3d at 23. The court reasoned that even with its “governmental
entity” status, Amtrak was a “self-interested entity” that holds “regulatory authority over its
competitors.” Id. at 31–34. Judge Brown, writing for the court, held that Amtrak was a selfinterested entity despite the Supreme Court’s designation that Amtrak was “not an autonomous
private enterprise.” Id. at 32 (citing Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1232). Amtrak’s statutory mandate
to be operated and managed as a for-profit corporation, to interact with the private sector, and to
minimize the need for government subsidies all contributed to the indication that Amtrak is a selfinterested entity. Id. Further, Congress provided Amtrak with incentives to maximize profits by
allowing their officers to be paid higher than market rate if the organization did not receive federal
subsidies. Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 24303(b) (2012). There are arguments to be made that Amtrak
is not a self-interested entity because its statutory command to act “as a for-profit corporation” is
nothing more than a mandate to run efficiently within the government, but it does not affect the
following analysis. The significant portion of the court’s opinion is that Congress is able to give
Amtrak regulatory power in some capacity, subjecting it to the Appointments Clause.
Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1239 (“[A]ccountability demands that principal officers be appointed
by the President. The President, after all, must have ‘the general administrative control of those
executing the laws,’ and this principle applies with special force to those who can ‘[e]xercise
significant authority’ without direct supervision.” (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted)
(citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; then quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926);
and then quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976)).
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II. PRINCIPAL OFFICERS, INFERIOR OFFICERS, AND GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES
Now that the Supreme Court has determined Amtrak to be a
governmental entity with regulatory power for separation of powers
purposes, the next step in determining the constitutionality of Amtrak’s
structure is determining the status of Amtrak’s board members, particularly
its President.
The Appointments Clause of the Constitution gives the President of the
United States the power to appoint officers of the United States with the
advice and consent of the Senate.46 This power extends to what we now call
principal officers, distinguished from what the Constitution calls “inferior
Officers.”47
Inferior officers can be appointed, with congressional
authorization, by the President alone, Courts of Law, or Heads of
Departments.48
While the Appointments Clause discusses principal and inferior officers,
it is not true that all federal workers fall into one of those two categories.49
Workers who are not officers, therefore, must fall within a third category, one
we will label “government employees.”
When determining whether the President of Amtrak is constitutionally
elected, one must consider what type of official he is. If he is a principal
officer, he is surely unconstitutionally elected, since he would need to be
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. If he is an inferior
officer, he may be unconstitutionally elected, depending on whether Amtrak
as an agency is considered a “Department” and its board members are
considered its “Head.”50 If he is a mere government employee, then there is
no problem with his election, since the Constitution imposes no obligations
on appointing (or hiring) government employees.
This Article makes the argument that the President of Amtrak is an
inferior officer because while he holds significant authority, he is subordinate
to and subject to the control of principal officers.

46
47
48
49

50

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Id.
Id.
See generally Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 452
(2018) (analyzing the dividing line between inferior officers and “lower-level, non-Article II officials
known as employees”).
See infra Part III.
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A. Officers Versus Government Employees
The President of Amtrak cannot be considered a mere government
employee because he clearly has some discretion in his decision-making and
performs his duties with “significant authority.”
1. The Law
Besides the phrase “established by Law,” the Constitution does not
clearly speak to what constitutes an officer versus an employee.51 This
distinction may have large implications. For example, as of 2017, the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) alone had over 15,000
employees,52 and no one would contend that each of them needed to be
appointed by the Administrator of the EPA. To hold otherwise would have
huge ramifications for the entire administrative state, requiring everyone
from office administrators to aides to custodial workers to be hired by the
head of whatever department they are tied to. So, the question persists: how
important must a government worker be to be considered at least an inferior
officer? What would their duties look like? To answer these questions, we
can turn to three sources: Framers’ intent, case law, and policy.53
Framers’ intent does not help too much in answering the question
because the Framers did not seem concerned with the question of who would
be an officer, only with who would be able to appoint those officers.54
However, the Court in Buckley v. Valeo opined that in describing the “Officers
of the United States, . . . the drafters had a less frivolous purpose in mind”
than mere “etiquette or protocol” and believed the term was “intended to
have substantive meaning.”55
With that alleged intent in mind, the Court held that a person who
“exercis[es] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States”
is an officer.56 Labeling “significant authority” as the deciding factor for an
officer ruled out the circular argument used previously that officers are
officers because they are appointed.57 However, this distinction did not make
51
52
53

54
55
56
57

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
EPA’s Budget and Spending, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget (last visited Jan. 11,
2019).
For a greater discussion on many factors that help define the difference between “officer” and
“employee,” see generally Edward Susolik, Note, Separation of Powers and Liberty: The Appointments
Clause, Morrison v. Olson, and Rule of Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1543–46 (1990).
Id. at 1544.
424 U.S. 1, 125–26 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted); Susolik, supra note 53, at 1544–45.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
See, e.g., Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516 (1920) (“Whether the incumbent is an officer
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answering the question significantly easier because it did little work in
defining what counted as “significant authority.”58 The only examples of this
authority it provided were “rulemaking, [and writing] advisory opinions.”59
Fifteen years later, the Court in Freytag v. Commissioner determined that
Special Trial Judges (“STJs”) were officers rather than mere employees
because they performed “more than ministerial tasks” such as taking
testimony, conducting trials, ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and
enforcing compliance with discovery orders.60 The Court emphasized that
the duties required the “exercise [of] significant discretion,”61 a point relied
on in a 2000 D.C. Circuit case, Landry v. FDIC, which held that “final
decisionmaking power” was critical to the officer-employee distinction.62
The Supreme Court’s most recent writing on this question came in Lucia v.
SEC.63 The case asked whether Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or the “Commission”) should
be considered officers or not. Comparing ALJs to Freytag’s STJs, the Court
ruled that ALJs were officers because their position was created by statute
and because their authority was significant.64 As in Freytag, Justice Kagan
cited their ability to “[r]eceiv[e] evidence[,]” “[e]xamine witnesses[,]” and
“conduct trials.”65
The undeveloped test outlined by the courts can be further clarified by
looking at the policy goals of the Appointments Clause. The Appointments
Clause provides accountability and transparency to the public. Mandating
that officers are appointed by individuals ensures that the people know who
appointed them and can hold the individual accountable if the officers make
poor decisions.66 If accountability is a goal, then the officers must be doing

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

or an employee is determined by the manner in which Congress has specifically provided for the
creation of the several positions, their duties and appointment thereto.”); United States v.
Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509–10 (1878); see also Stacy M. Lindstedt, Developing the Duffy Defect:
Identifying Which Government Workers are Constitutionally Required to Be Appointed, 76 MO. L. REV. 1143,
1151 (2011) (“Several early Appointments Clause cases took cursory looks at the officer-employee
distinction, sometimes relying entirely on whether the person had been appointed to determine if a
person was an officer.”).
See Susolik, supra note 53, at 1545.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140.
501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991).
Id. at 882.
204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
Id. at 2053 (finding that ALJs conduct similar vital functions as STJs).
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
See E. Garrett West, Clarifying the Employee-Officer Distinction in Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 127
YALE L.J. FORUM 42, 55 (2017) (“The President, then, always depends on Congress to provide for
the appointment of his officers, and the public will know that he (or the ‘Heads of Department’ or
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something important enough that accountability matters.67 This would
suggest that finality in decision-making is important as well as the power to
compel action.68
Thus, it is still unclear exactly what “significant authority” entails. The
best understanding we have involves some sort of discretionary power that
includes more than simple ministerial tasks. In accordance with the goals of
the Appointments Clause, the power should be significant enough that the
individual’s appointers should be held accountable for poor decisions.
2. The President of Amtrak is Not a Government Employee
The President of Amtrak must be considered an officer and not a mere
government employee because he acts as the leader of Amtrak and is able to
make important decisions regarding how to run the corporation.
Statutorily, the President of Amtrak only has one specified duty: to
designate a panel of members that reviews maintenance and rehabilitation
plans.69 However, to say that this is his only role would be a
mischaracterization of what he actually does. Nor do his statutorily defined
duties designate him as an officer or not. We would otherwise fall into the
same circular trap of defining an officer as someone who Congress says is an
officer. This would allow Congress to circumvent the Constitution’s
separation of powers doctrine by failing to list the duties of personnel who
are in practice principal or inferior officers, but who were not appointed
according to the Constitution.
The President of Amtrak is the administrative leader of the railroad.70 In
an interview with National Public Radio (“NPR”), the current President of
Amtrak, Richard H. Anderson, acknowledged that his duties comprised
mostly of “day-to-day management[,] and persuading the government to do
more to continue support of the system.”71 He serves as the public face of

67

68
69
70

71

the ‘Courts of Law’) is to blame when those officers fail in their duties.”).
Some scholars disagree, maintaining that the original meaning of “officers” is much broader than
that. See, e.g., Mascott, supra note 49, at 454 (arguing that the proper test for determining who an
officer is to ask if he is “one whom the government entrusts with ongoing responsibility to perform
a statutory duty of any level of importance”).
See West, supra note 66, at 44 (proposing a test to determine who officers are by asking whether they
have the ability to “alter legal rights and obligations on behalf of the United States”)
49 U.S.C. § 24305(b)(1) (2008) (amended (2012)) (assigning the President of Amtrak the power to
select members of the review panel).
Amtrak President Joseph Boardman, 2000s., AMTRAK, https://history.amtrak.com/archives/amtrakpresident-joseph-boardman-2000s (last visited Jan. 11, 2019) (expounding on initiatives lead by the
ninth president of Amtrak).
New CEO Richard Anderson Outlines His Vision for Amtrak, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Sept. 5,
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the corporation by outlining his vision for the future of Amtrak72 and by
responding to major accidents.73 The President of Amtrak also serves as the
representative of the corporation to Congress, and is “summoned to
hearings” to answer questions about Amtrak’s funding problems.74
A look at the bylaws of Amtrak shines more light on his responsibilities
and powers. The President is able to call special meetings of shareholders or
board members.75 He is to be consulted and asked for a recommendation if
the board wishes to remove any other officers.76 By default, the President is
the Chief Executive Officer of Amtrak, a title that carries numerous
responsibilities, including “general supervision of the affairs of the
Corporation” and the supervision of all employees and officers.77 The
President also has the power to approve and execute indemnification
agreements with third parties.78
Lastly, the President of Amtrak sits on the board of directors for Amtrak
with the other nine members as a nonvoting member.79 Although he cannot
vote to make significant decisions, his inclusion on the board indicates that
he holds some significance and may contribute to ideas discussed at board
meetings.
From these responsibilities, there is every indication that the President of
Amtrak has “significant authority” as used in the legal sense. As the head
and face of the organization, he decides what to focus on and how to respond

72

73

74

75
76
77

78
79

2017, 4:29 PM) https://www.npr.org/2017/09/05/548715358/new-ceo-richard-andersonoutlines-his-vision-for-amtrak.
Amtrak’s CEO Shares His Vision for Rail’s Future, CBS NEWS (Sept. 5, 2017, 12:44 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/amtrak-ceo-outlines-vision-for-rail-system (discussing initiatives
to improve Amtrak such as increasing train speeds and providing more options for nonstop service).
Mark Matousek, Amtrak CEO Responds to Deadly Accident: ‘We Are Deeply Saddened by All That Has
Happened Today,’ BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 18, 2017, 5:58 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
amtrak-ceo-responds-to-deadly-accident-2017-12 (noting that one role of the President of Amtrak
is expressing condolences after rail accidents).
Ashley Halsey III, Amtrak President Joseph Boardman Says He Plans to Step Down Next Year, WASH. POST
(Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/12/11/amtrakpresident-joseph-boardman-says-he-plans-to-step-down-next-year/?utm_term=.22d33908dee8.
NAT’L R.R. PASSENGER CORP., AMENDED & RESTATED BYLAWS § 3.03 (2016) (on file with
author) (describing the procedure for calling a special meeting of the shareholders).
Id. § 6.03 (describing the procedure for officer removal by the Amtrak board).
Id. § 6.06; see also Amtrak Names Former Delta Executive Richard Anderson as New CEO, FORTUNE (June
26, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/26/amtrak-richard-anderson-ceo/. While the President
and CEO are often the same person, this is not necessarily always the case. For example, when the
current President of Amtrak was named, the previous President and CEO decided to be co-CEOs
with the new President for approximately six months. Id.
NAT’L R.R. PASSENGER CORP., supra note 75, § 9.01(d)(2); see also id. § 9.03 (assigning the execution
of indemnification agreements to the President or General Counsel of Amtrak).
49 U.S.C. § 24302 (2008) (amended (2012)).
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to the public. His duties are not “mere ministerial tasks” but to lead the
organization through challenges and to make major decisions of policy. He
is surely, therefore, an officer of the United States and must be appointed
according to the Constitution.
B. Distinguishing Between Principal and Inferior Officers
Since we can safely assume that the President of Amtrak is some sort of
officer, the next step in this analysis is determining whether he is an inferior
officer or principal officer. This Article argues that the President of Amtrak
should be considered an inferior officer because he is subordinate to and
subject to control by the rest of the board, who are all principal officers.
1. The Law
In Morrison v. Olsen, Chief Justice Rehnquist outlined a four-part balancing
test that determined whether an officer is inferior or principal.80 The case
centered around the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 and whether the
Attorney General’s appointment of the Independent Counsel was
constitutional. The first part of the test determined whether the officer is “to
some degree ‘inferior’ in rank and authority,” holding that an officer is inferior
in this sense if they can be removed by a higher Executive Branch official who
is not the President.81 The second part of the test regarded whether the officer
had “certain, limited duties” or not.82 Duties are “limited” when the official
performing them cannot set policy on behalf of the government or is restricted
to working on assigned tasks.83 The third part of the test concerned the limited
jurisdiction of the officer.84 Lastly, the shorter the duration of the officer’s
tenure, the stronger the case the officer is inferior.85

80
81
82
83
84
85

487 U.S. 654, 670–73 (1988).
Id. at 671; see also id. at 672–73 (noting that the independent counsel was a “subordinate officer”
because he could be removed by the Attorney General).
Id. at 671.
Id. at 671–72.
Id. at 672.
Id.
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Justice Scalia wrote a widely celebrated86 dissent in Morrison that claimed
the majority missed a necessary condition for defining an inferior officer:
subordination.87 An officer can only be subordinate if he or she is “subject
to supervision” and to some sort of control by a superior officer.88 Because
the Independent Counsel could only be removed by the Attorney General
“for cause,” Justice Scalia argued, there was not a sufficient level of
superiority and control.
Nine years after Morrison, Justice Scalia penned an opinion in Edmond v.
United States that concerned whether judges of the Coast Guard Court of
Criminal Appeals (“CGCCA”) were inferior or principal officers.89 The
Court, while applying the Morrison test, focused on the first factor: whether
the officers had a superior.90 Although the Court found that CGCCA judges
had failed two of the factors (limited jurisdiction and tenure) and did not
discuss limited duties, they still held them to be inferior officers.91 It is not
clear that the Morrison test was applied as evenly as it had been nine years
prior.92 Although Morrison was technically applied, there is good reason to
believe its four-factor test had been practically overruled by Edmond.93 Thus,
the most important factor when determining whether an officer is inferior or
principal officer is whether the officer is subject to some sort of supervision
and control by a principal officer.

86

87
88
89
90
91
92

93

Id. at 697–734 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Terry Eastland, Scalia’s Finest Opinion, WKLY. STANDARD
(Mar. 11, 2016, 12:40 AM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/scalias-finest-opinion/article/
2001510 (explaining Scalia’s dissent in Morrison and its popularity); Justice Kagan and Judges Srinivasan
and Kethledge Offer Views from the Bench, STAN. L. SCH. (May 30, 2015), https://law.stanford.edu/
stanford-lawyer/articles/justice-kagan-and-judges-srinivasan-and-kethledge-offer-views-from-thebench/ (describing an event at which Justice Elena Kagan described Justice Scalia’s lone dissent in
Morrison as “one of the greatest dissents ever written and every year it gets better” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 720–21 (discussing that inferior officers would “by chain of command still be under the direct
control of the President”).
520 U.S. 651, 653, 660–61 (1997).
Id. at 663 (arguing that political accountability requires an officer’s work to be directly supervised
by a person appointed by the President and approved by the Senate).
Id. at 661.
See id. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“It does not follow,
however, that if one is subject to some supervision and control, one is an inferior
officer. Accordingly, in Morrison, the Court’s determination that the independent counsel was ‘to
some degree inferior’ to the Attorney General did not end the enquiry.” (internal citations omitted)
(citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
See generally Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court’s New Appointments
Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1998) (arguing that the balancing test applied in
Morrison was supplanted by a bright-line rule put forth in Edmond hinging on whether the
purportedly inferior officer has a superior).
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2. The President of Amtrak Should Be Considered an Inferior Officer
The President of Amtrak should be considered an inferior officer because
he is clearly subordinate to the board that appointed him. Since he no longer
has voting power, he is unable to affect decisions at the highest level and is
only able to make management decisions. Although the President of
Amtrak’s power is significant, some entity other than the President of the
United States—namely, the board of Amtrak—can replace him. Therefore,
the President of Amtrak is subordinate to the board, whose members are
principal officers of the United States.
In his concurrence in Department of Transportation v. Association of American
Railroads, Justice Alito lays out his argument for why the President of Amtrak
is a principal officer in the following manner: 1) multimember bodies may head
an agency; 2) those who head agencies must be principal officers; and 3) every
member of a multimember body heading an agency must be a principal
officer, since every member of a multimember body could cast the deciding
vote with respect to a particular decision.94 Although Justice Alito’s logic
determines that casting a deciding vote with respect to a particular decision is
a sufficient condition, not a necessary condition, it is safe to assume that this
was his main issue with the board’s arrangement, considering this is the only
point he raised. Although the President of Amtrak sits on the board, the FAST
Act removed his voting power.95 Thus, he is unable to “cast [a] deciding vote
with respect to a particular decision,”96 mooting Justice Alito’s argument.
Further, the modern test outlined by the Supreme Court supports the
contention that the President of Amtrak is an inferior officer. The President
of Amtrak is an officer who “serve[s] at the pleasure of the board,” meaning
that the board has authority to remove the officer at will.97 Since he is able
to be removed by an entity that is not the President of the United States, the
first and most important factor of Morrison, and the only significant factor in
Edmond, is satisfied.
Comparing the scope of the President of Amtrak’s duties to the scope of
the duties assigned to the Independent Counsel in Morrison, we can conclude
that they are similar in dimension. The President of Amtrak is granted a
wide range of duties that all pertain to a particular organization and mission,

94

95
96
97

135 S. Ct. 1225, 1239 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that, given that multimember bodies may
head agencies, and those who head agencies must be principal officers, it follows that every member
of a multimember body heading an agency must be a principal officer).
See Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 11205, 129 Stat. 1312,
1637 (2015).
Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1239 (Alito, J., concurring).
49 U.S.C. § 24303(a) (2008) (amended (2012)).
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just as the Independent Counsel was granted duties for a specific goal in
mind. Both of their jurisdictions are similarly restricted to one organization
or goal.
Although the President of Amtrak does not have a limited tenure, his
subordination to the board without any primary decision-making power in
the form of a board vote renders him an inferior officer.
III. AMTRAK AS A DEPARTMENT
In Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads, Justice Alito
argued that even if the government was correct in its assertion that the
President of Amtrak was an inferior officer, that President still may be
unconstitutionally elected.98 Inferior officers can only be appointed by the
President of the United States alone, Courts of Law, or Heads of
Departments.99 Justice Alito contended that it is not clear that Amtrak is a
Department. However, case law and policy both indicate that Amtrak is a
Department and its multimember board is its Head for Appointment Clause
purposes.
A. Defining a Department
For Appointments Clause purposes, a “Department” does not have to be
what is traditionally referred to as an “executive department.” This issue was
first tackled in Freytag v. Commissioner when the Court was confronted with the
constitutionality of a United States Tax Court judge appointing STJs.100
After establishing that the STJs were inferior officers, the Court set out to
answer whether the tax court should (or could) be considered a “Court of
Law” or “Head[ ] of Department[ ]” according to the Appointments
Clause.101 After discussing the historical reasons for the Appointments
Clause, the majority rejected the tax court as a “Department,” instead
holding that “Head[ ] of Department[ ]” should be confined to “executive
divisions like the Cabinet-level departments.”102 It reasoned that the
Appointments Clause is primarily concerned with accountability and
Cabinet members are readily identifiable and directly accountable to the
President.103 The spirit of the Appointments Clause, the majority reasoned,
98
99
100
101
102
103

Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1239 (Alito, J., concurring).
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
501 U.S. 868, 870 (1991).
Id.. at 884, 886.
Id. at 887–88.
Id. at 886.
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would be too diluted if the number of “actors eligible to appoint” were
enlarged so much.104 While emphatically declaring that the tax court is “not
a Departmen[t],”105 the Court, in a footnote, stated that it “[does] not
address here any question involving an appointment of an inferior officer by
the head of one of the principal agencies, such as . . . the Securities and
Exchange Commission.”106 The majority ultimately held that the scheme
was nevertheless constitutional because the Article I courts could be
considered “Courts of Law” for Appointments Clause purposes.107
A concurrence written by Justice Scalia and joined by three other
members of the Court agreed that the STJs were inferior officers and that
the Chief Judge of the tax court had the constitutional authority to appoint
them, but as a Head of Department, not as a Court of Law.108 Heads of
Departments include “the heads of all agencies immediately below the
President in the organizational structure of the Executive Branch,” Justice
Scalia said.109 The departments in the Appointments Clause are the same as
the departments in the Opinions Clause, and surely the President is able to
solicit opinions from principal officers in non-Cabinet departments, Justice
Scalia reasoned.110
The Court wrestled with the issue again in 2010 in Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”).111 In PCAOB, an
accounting firm and the Free Enterprise Fund sued the titular PCAOB
seeking declaratory judgment that the board was unconstitutional.112 The
board was created as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in response to
several accounting scandals and its board members were appointed by the
SEC.113 Among its other arguments, the Free Enterprise Fund argued that
the SEC had no authority to appoint the board members because they were
not a “Department,” further alleging that departments referred only to
“Executive departments,” such as the State, Treasury, or Defense
Departments.114 The majority, led by Chief Justice Roberts, was tasked with

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 885.
Id. at 888 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 887 n.4.
Id. at 890–91.
Id. at 901 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 918.
Id. at 918–19.
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. (PCAOB), 561 U.S. 477, 487 (2010).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 510 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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answering the issue left in the footnote in Freytag.115 Ultimately, the Court
sided with Justice Scalia, who “would have concluded that the Commission
is indeed such a ‘Department,’ because it is a ‘free-standing, self-contained
entity in the Executive Branch.’”116 Chief Justice Roberts further adopted
Justice Scalia’s historical precedent, in which Congress authorized the
Postmaster General to appoint assistants and deputies—surely inferior
officers—without being in the President’s Cabinet.117 Ultimately, because
the SEC was a “freestanding component of the Executive Branch, not
subordinate to or contained within any other such component,” it satisfied
the requirements of “Department” for Appointments Clause purposes.118
PCAOB offered the last word on what constitutes a Department. A
Department does not need to be one traditionally recognized as within the
President’s Cabinet and should be a freestanding component of the
Executive Branch, not subordinate to or within any other government
agency.
B. Multimember Boards
A Department may be composed of a multimember board and its
members may collectively act as the Head of the Department to appoint
inferior officers.119 In PCAOB, the Free Enterprise Fund alleged that:
1) PCAOB members were principal officers and thus had to be appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; 2) even if PCAOB
members were inferior officers, they were not constitutionally appointed
because the SEC could not have properly been regarded as a Department in
the constitutional sense; and 3) even if the SEC could be considered a
Department, the several Commissioners of the Commission could not be
considered its “Head.”120 The Court first concluded, under Edmond, that the
board members were inferior officers.121 Next, the Court determined the

115

116
117
118
119
120

121

See id. (“In Freytag, we specifically reserved the question whether a ‘principal agency, such as . . . the
Securities and Exchange Commission,’ is a ‘Department’ under the Appointments Clause.”
(internal citations omitted); Freytag, 501 U.S. at 887 n.4.
PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 510–11 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 511.
Id.
Id. at 511–12.
Id. at 487–88 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Free Enterprise Fund made additional
arguments, some of which succeeded, unlike its Appointment Clause arguments. Ultimately, the
Court held that two layers of “for cause” removal (one for the SEC and one for the PCAOB),
subverted the Executive’s ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Id. at 498.
PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 510.
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SEC is a “Department.”122 Lastly, the Court saw no reason “why a
multimember body may not be the ‘Head’ of a ‘Department.’”123 The Court
found support for this proposition in earlier statutory practice, case law, and
constitutional interpretation.124 Specifically, the Court held that the
Appointments Clause permits collective appointments by the Courts of Law
and allows the Houses of Congress to collectively appoint its own officers, so
multimembers bodies were commonplace among agencies.125
C. Amtrak Is a Department Because it Is Independent of Other Agencies
Amtrak is a Department for Appointments Clause purposes because it is
independent within the Executive Branch and is not subject to substantial
control by other departments. Justice Alito’s main concern with labeling
Amtrak as a Department was its subordinate status to another component of
the Executive Branch.126 Justice Alito read the conditions outlined in
PCAOB—freestanding component and lack of subordination—as necessary
rather than sufficient, and cursorily determined that Amtrak was not a
“Department.”127 However, even when reading the conditions as necessary,
Justice Alito was incorrect on this issue. First, Amtrak is formally not a part
of any other government agency. Second, Amtrak is not substantially
controlled by another government agency. Thus, Amtrak is a Department
whose multimember board may appoint inferior officers.

122
123
124
125
126

127

Id. at 512 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 512–13 (emphasizing the textual support that the Constitution lends to this proposition).
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. § 3, cl. 5; id. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240 (2015) (“A ‘Department’ may not
be ‘subordinate to or contained within any other such component’ of the Executive Branch.”
(quoting PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 511)).
See id.
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1. Amtrak is Formally Independent of Any Other Government Agency
Formally, Amtrak is not a part of any other government agency. The
Department of Transportation houses eleven sub-departments, one of which
is the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”).128 Amtrak is not considered
one of the FRA’s subsidiaries and as a formal matter is totally divested from
the FRA. In the entire subchapter within the United States Code on the
Department of Transportation, Amtrak is only mentioned once, and only to
be included in a study to be done by the Secretary on the feasibility of
constructing high speed ground transportation systems in the United States
due in 1995.129
Rather, Amtrak exists by independent statutory
authorization and exists in a separate section of the United States Code from
the Department of Transportation (“DOT”).130 This would suggest that
Amtrak is a Department according to Justice Scalia and Chief Justice
Roberts as a freestanding entity within the Executive Branch.
2. Amtrak is Not Controlled by Any Other Department
Further, Amtrak is not controlled by any other department and operates
independently of other Departments. Justice Alito was concerned with
Amtrak’s relation to other Departments, inferring that it may be
“subordinate” to them. It could be inferred that an executive department
who has substantial control over another formally independent department,
is superior to that department. Namely, Justice Alito mentioned the DOT,
the FRA, and the STB. Below, I discuss the ties these agencies have to
Amtrak and why Justice Alito’s fears that Amtrak is subordinate to these
agencies are ultimately unfounded.
Justice Alito discussed the DOT as potentially having control over
Amtrak. The Secretary of Transportation has a permanent seat on Amtrak’s
board and holds a vote which could be a crucial tiebreaker to deciding certain
matters, such as electing Amtrak’s President.131 Further, the Secretary of
Transportation has statutory authority to exempt Amtrak from its mandate
128

129
130

131

Our Administrations, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/administrations (last
visited Jan. 11, 2019) (identifying the FRA as one of the eleven sub-department groups of the
Department of Transportation).
49 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1)(C) (2012); id. § 309(d)(2)(K).
See Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327 (financing and creating
a “national rail passenger system”); see also 49 U.S.C. § 24301 (2008) (amended (2012)) (discussing
Amtrak in a separate section of the United States Code concerning the DOT).
49 U.S.C. § 24302(a)(1)(A) (codifying the Secretary of Transportation as one of nine board
directors); id. § 24303(a) (codifying that the President of Amtrak and its other officers are elected by
the board of directors of Amtrak).
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to buy articles, materials, and supplies mined, produced, or manufactured in
the United States.132 The FRA has been executing and overseeing grants to
Amtrak with congressional funds since its creation, providing $1.385 billion
alone in 2016.133 Amtrak’s yearly expenses in 2016 were approximately $4.3
billion, meaning that the federal government provides almost one third of
Amtrak’s budget per year.134 This may suggest that the Secretary of
Transportation and the FRA have substantial control over Amtrak and its
activities. This would speak directly to Justice Alito’s concerns that Amtrak is
“subordinate to” another part of the Executive Branch.135 This concern is
ultimately unsupported. Amtrak has eight board members that are appointed
independent of the DOT to counter the Secretary of Transportation that sits
on the board. The FRA executes and oversees grants to Amtrak by the grace
of Congress who appropriates the funds in the first place. The FRA’s grants
to Amtrak do not operate like federal grants to states, that is to say, on a
conditional basis. They are simply a mechanism for Amtrak to receive the
funds that Congress intended them to have.
Justice Alito’s concurrence also mentioned Amtrak’s relationship to the
STB. In a passing comment, he wrote that Amtrak may be subordinate to
the STB because in “jointly creating metrics and standards” with the FRA,
it may have to defer to an arbitrator appointed by the STB.136 He also
suggested that the STB itself may be part of the DOT, further implying that
Amtrak is within that Department.137 While it is possible that at the time of
writing a court would have held the view that the STB is a part of the DOT,
Congress seems to have anticipated this problem and avoided it in December
2015, around the same time it instituted the changes to Amtrak’s corporate
board.138 In its changes, the STB was moved out of the subchapter of
“Department of Transportation” in the United States Code to “Other
Government Agencies.”139 The board members of the STB are all appointed
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

139

49 U.S.C. § 24305(f)(4) (codifying an exemption for Amtrak from having to comply with this
statutory mandate).
Federal Grants to Amtrak, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.: FED. R.R. ADMIN.,
https://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/P0249 (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
National Fact Sheet FY 2016, AMTRAK, https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/
english/public/documents/corporate/nationalfactsheets/National-Fact-Sheet-FY2016-0717.pdf.
Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing whether
“Amtrak is ‘subordinate to’ the STB”).
Id.
Id.
See generally Surface Transportation Board Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-110, 129
Stat. 2228 (describing the purpose of the Act as “establish[ing] the Surface Transportation Board
as an independent establishment”).
49 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012) (establishing the STB within the DOT); 49 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (2015)
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by the President and confirmed by the Senate, implying that they are all
independently principal officers.140 Further, the statutory language was
changed from “[t]here is hereby established within the Department of
Transportation the Surface Transportation Board” to “[t]he Surface
Transportation Board is an independent establishment of the United States
Government.”141 Although statutory language is not dispositive of the
matter, there seems to be no current link between the STB to the DOT.
Further, it would be logically inconsistent to classify Amtrak as subordinate
to the STB if we were not willing to classify the FRA as subordinate to the
STB, since the FRA is a partner with Amtrak in creating the metrics and
standards. The FRA is a sub-department of the DOT, so classifying it under
the STB would either imply that the entirety of the DOT was subordinate to
the STB or would say that two departments can be superior to a subdepartment, which would only complicate the aim of separation of powers
even further. As a practical matter, devising the “metrics and standards” in
conjunction with the FRA is one small part of what Amtrak does and is
responsible for doing. If its requirement to defer to the STB for these matters
indicates that it is subordinate to the STB, it would complicate all matters of
inter-agency collaboration.142
Because Amtrak is for the most part independent from all other
Departments of government and its board is directly accountable to the
President of the United States, it should be considered a Department and its
multimember board its Head for Appointments Clause purposes.
CONCLUSION
Had Congress not been so quick to act with the aptly named FAST Act,
Amtrak may have been vulnerable to any entity who had a claim against its
regulatory power. In 2015, its President had voting power on the board and
was not appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. However,
there should be little cause for concern as amended. The President of
Amtrak currently does not have voting power and is subject to the direct
control of principal officers, which comfortably places him in the status of at

140
141
142

(establishing the STB as an “independent establishment of the United States Government”).
49 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) (establishing the power to appoint members to the board of Amtrak rests
with the President of the United States).
See generally 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (noting the amendment instituted in 2015).
See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131,
1173 n.199 (2012) (describing the current practice of the Financial Stability Oversight Counsel in
overseeing disputes between independent regulatory agencies).
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least inferior officer. As an inferior officer, he can be appointed by a Head
of Department. Amtrak is a Department because it is an agency independent
of any other Department of the United States. The voting members of its
multimember board are its Head who have the power to appoint their own
inferior officers.
In SEC v. Lucia, a new trial was ordered because ALJs were considered
inferior officers but were not appointed by the SEC board-members.143 Due
to Congress’s actions, the next time a disgruntled regulated party has a
problem with an Amtrak policy or regulation, it will have one fewer
argument to use in court. The President of Amtrak can sleep well knowing
his job is safe.

143

Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018).

